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Cooperative versus decentralized strategies
in three-pursuer single-evader games
Marco Casini, Andrea Garulli
Abstract
The value of cooperation in pursuit-evasion games is investigated. The considered setting is that of three pursuers chasing one
evader in a planar environment. The optimal evader trajectory for a well-known decentralized pursuer strategy is characterized.
This result is instrumental to derive upper and lower bounds to the game length, in the case in which the pursuers cooperate
in the chasing strategy. It is shown that the cooperation cannot reduce the capture time by more than one half with respect to
the decentralized case, and that such bound is tight.
Index Terms
pursuit-evasion games, autonomous agents, cooperative control, differential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuit-evasion games involving many pursuers against a single evader have been intensively investigated for quite a long
time. These problems fall within the broader class of differential games [1], [2], for which a vast literature is available (see [3]
and references therein). A distinctive trait of these games is that the union of the reachable sets of all pursuers is in general
a nonconvex, or even disconnected, set. This makes the characterization of successful pursuit strategies nontrivial, even for
simple problem settings, like the case of three pursuers chasing one evader in the plane [4]. More complex environments
usually lead to very involved geometric conditions [5].
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest towards cooperative capture games, motivated both by the variety of
applications in which they play a key role and by the development of technologies allowing networks of agents to collaborate
in the execution of complex tasks, see, e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. An interesting aspect that has not been fully understood
yet, concerns the benefits of the pursuers to cooperate in the capture game. A popular strategy in the literature is the one
proposed in [11], which can be seen as a specialization of classical differential game solutions, proposed for example in
[12], [13]. Such strategies are fully decentralized, as each pursuer is aware only of the evader move but does not have any
information about the other pursuers’ behavior. On the other hand, cooperative strategies in which pursuers have full or
partial knowledge of the game state, have been recently proposed by several authors [14], [15], [16], [17]. However, it is not
easy to quantify the advantage of playing such strategies with respect to the fully decentralized ones, which do not require
the use of a complex communication infrastructure.
In this paper, we consider the problem of three pursuers chasing one evader in a planar environment. The first contribution
is a strategy guaranteeing the maximum survival time for the evader, when the pursuers adopt the decentralized strategy
proposed in [11]. Then, upper and lower bounds for the game length are derived, assuming that the pursuers play in a
cooperative way. The main result shows that, no matter how they collaborate, the pursuers cannot reduce the game length to
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less than one-half of that resulting from the decentralized strategy. Moreover, it is shown that the above bounds are tight, in
the sense that there exist games in which the bounds are actually achieved. Finally, the maximum advantage deriving from
cooperation is quantified for some specific game initial conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the three-pursuer one-evader game is formulated. In Section III, the
decentralized pursuit strategy proposed in [11] is recalled and the corresponding optimal evader’s strategy is devised along
with the resulting game length. In Section IV, a lower bound on capture time is derived, irrespectively of the strategy adopted
by the pursuers. A comparison between the game duration for cooperative and decentralized pursuers’ strategies is reported
in Section V while some examples of games are reported in Section VI. Conclusions and future developments are reported
in Section VII.
II. PURSUIT-EVASION GAME
A. Notation
Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidean space and ‖ · ‖ be the Euclidean norm. The transpose of a vector v is denoted by
v′. Let V,W ∈ R2, we denote by VW the segment with V and W as endpoints. Let V, v ∈ R2, we denote by L(V, v) the
line passing through V with direction v, i.e.,
L(V, v) = {X ∈ R2 : X = V + αv, α ∈ R}.
B. Problem formulation
A pursuit-evasion game involving three pursuers is considered. It is assumed that the players move in an open and empty
two-dimensional environment. Let E(t) ∈ R2 and Pi(t) ∈ R2, i = 1, 2, 3, denote the evader and pursuers location at time
t, respectively. The aim of the pursuers is to capture the evader, i.e., Pi(t) = E(t) for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, at some
time t.
The following assumptions are enforced throughout the text.
Assumption 1: The pursuers and the evader have the same speed, set to 1 without loss of generality. Moreover, we assume
the players have simple motion, i.e., they can freely move in any direction.
Assumption 2: The initial evader position is strictly inside the convex hull of the pursuers.
If the players move at the same speed, enforcing Assumption 2 is standard, otherwise the evader may easily escape going
straight along a direction opposite to the convex hull of the pursuers [18]. On the contrary, if Assumption 2 holds, there
exist pursuers’ strategies which guarantee capture of the evader in finite time [18], [11].
For a given configuration of the players at time t, let us define as V(t) the Voronoi cell associated to the evader, i.e.,
the region of the plane closer to the evader than to the pursuers, at time t. Under Assumptions 1-2, V(t) turns out to be a
triangle; let us denote by Vi(t), i = 1, 2, 3, its vertices. For a given triangle V , we denote by l,m, s the longest, medium
and smallest edge of V , respectively. Moreover, we name the vertices of V such that V1 is the vertex joining the longest
and medium edges, while pursuers are labeled such that Pi is the pursuer farthest from Vi. It can be easily observed that
(see Fig. 1)
‖Vi − Pi‖ > ‖Vi − E‖ , i = 1, 2, 3 . (1)
The pursuit game can be played in continuous time, in which players simultaneously set their velocities, or discrete
time, when players move in turn. In the latter case, by convention, the evader moves first, and then all pursuers move
simultaneously after they have observed the evader’s move. Let e(t) ∈ R2 and wi(t) ∈ R2, i = 1, 2, 3, be such that
‖e(t)‖ = 1 and ‖wi(t)‖ = 1.
In continuous-time games, the motion models are
 E˙(t) = e(t)P˙i(t) = wi(t) , i = 1, 2, 3 (2)
while in discrete-time games they move following
 E(t+ 1) = E(t) + e(t)Pi(t+ 1) = Pi(t) + wi(t) , i = 1, 2, 3 . (3)
In this paper, two classes of pursuers’ strategies are considered: decentralized (uncoordinated) and cooperative (coor-
dinated). A pursuers’ strategy is said decentralized if each pursuer does not have information about the other pursuers
and computes its move solely on the base of the evader position and move (i.e., E(t) and e(t)) and its own state Pi(t).
On the contrary, in the cooperative case, each pursuer knows the full game state and chooses its move depending on
P1(t), P2(t), P3(t), E(t) and e(t). In both cases, we assume the evader has a complete knowledge of the state of the game.
III. DECENTRALIZED PURSUIT STRATEGY
In this section, a decentralized pursuers’ strategy is recalled. It has been proposed in [12] for the continuous-time
framework, and in [11] (under the name “Planes”) within the discrete-time setting. Such a strategy is designed in Rn and it
guarantees capture in finite time under Assumptions 1-2. In this paper, we will restrict the analysis to the two-dimensional
space.
Let Ci(t) = (Pi(t)+E(t))/2 and zi(t) = Pi(t)−E(t), i = 1, 2, 3. Denote by zi(t)⊥ a vector orthogonal to zi(t). Define
Bi(t) = L(E(t), e(t)) ∩ L(Ci(t), zi(t)⊥) .
For both models (2) and (3), define the pursuers’ moves wi(t), i = 1, 2, 3, as follows (see Fig. 1)
wi(t) =


e(t) if zi(t)
′e(t) ≤ 0 (4a)
Bi(t)− Pi(t)
‖Bi(t)− Pi(t)‖ if zi(t)
′e(t) > 0 (4b)
In words, when the evader moves towards an edge of the Voronoi cell (condition (4b)), the corresponding pursuer makes a
specular move which leaves the edge unchanged. Conversely, if the evader moves away from that edge (condition (4a)), the
pursuer makes the same move of the evader, thus causing a shrinking of the Voronoi cell (in Fig. 1, this occurs for pursuer
P3). It is worth remarking that in the latter case, the direction of the edge of the Voronoi cell does not change. Therefore,
all the Voronoi cells throughout the entire game are similar triangles, no matter of the path followed by the evader.
We refer to the decentralized pursuers’ strategy in (4a)-(4b) as D-strategy. Notice that in (4a)-(4b) each pursuer’s move
depends solely on the evader and its own state.
The results presented in this paper hold for both the continuous-time and the discrete-time framework. However, in the
discrete-time approach, such results do not take into account the quantization effect introduced by the discrete move, see
e.g., [19], [20]. Therefore, for ease of exposition, in the sequel we will refer to the continuous-time setting.
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Fig. 1. Example of pursuers’ moves based on the D-strategy. Pursuers P1 and P2 follow (4b), while P3 obeys to (4a).
A. Optimal evasion strategy against the D-strategy
Hereafter, a pursuers’ strategy will be said optimal when it guarantees capture in minimum time, while an evader’s strategy
is optimal if it guarantees survival of the evader for the longest time. In this subsection, an optimal evader’s strategy is
devised for games in which the pursuers play the D-strategy. Let us name such strategy as E . It is worthwhile to notice that
there exist several evader strategies which lead to the same optimal capture time; we will just focus on one of them.
Let E(0), Pi(0), i = 1, 2, 3, be given, and let V(0) be the corresponding Voronoi cell. Without loss of generality let us
assume the longest edge of V(0) be l = ‖V1(0)− V2(0)‖. Let v = V1(0)− V2(0) and denote by S and Q the intersection
points between the line passing through E(0) parallel to the longest side of the triangle and V(0) (see Fig. 2), i.e.,
S = V2(0)V3(0) ∩ L(E(0), v) (5)
and
Q = V1(0)V3(0) ∩ L(E(0), v) . (6)
Define the unitary vectors connecting the vertices of V(0) as
vij =
Vi(0)− Vj(0)
‖Vi(0)− Vj(0)‖ , i 6= j . (7)
In a similar way, define
vSE =
S − E(0)
‖S − E(0)‖ , vQE =
Q− E(0)
‖Q− E(0)‖
vV1Q =
V1(0)−Q
‖V1(0)−Q‖ .
Let us now define the evader’s strategy E as follows, see Fig. 2.
1) From E(0) the evader moves along vQE to Q.
2) Once in Q, it moves along vV1Q to V1(0).
3) Once in V1(0), it moves towards V2(0), until it reaches the farthest vertex of the current Voronoi cell, where it is
captured.
Remark 1: In order to simplify the exposition, when it is stated that the evader moves to a point which lies on the
boundary of V , we actually mean that it moves to an interior point of V which is arbitrarily close to the boundary. In fact,
such a move is feasible and safe, due to the fact that the evader can reach any point inside V without being captured, by
definition of the Voronoi cell. For instance, referring to item 1) of the E-strategy, the evader will move along vQE to a point
Q˜ such that ‖Q˜−Q‖ < δ, for a small δ > 0. In this respect, all the results presented in the paper must be intended as limit
results, obtained by letting δ tend to 0.
E(0)
V2(0)
V3(0)
V1(0)
S Q
V(0) V(τ1)
V(τ2)
V2(τ1) V2(τ2)
V3(τ1)
V3(τ2)
P3(0)
P1(0)
P2(0)
Fig. 2. Sketch of the evader’s strategy E . The evader follows the dotted arrows. The Voronoi cells at the beginning of steps 1, 2 and 3 are depicted in
black, red and blue, respectively.
In the next theorem, it is proved that the E-strategy is optimal for the evader when the pursuers play the D-strategy, and
the related game length MD is given.
Theorem 1: Let the pursuers play the D-strategy and the evader play the E-strategy. Then, the game will last for a time
MD = ‖S −Q‖+ ‖Q− V1(0)‖ . (8)
Moreover, the E-strategy is optimal for the evader.
See appendix.
Remark 2: In [12], an upper bound on the capture time is reported for the generic game played in Rn involving m
pursuers. Let zi = Pi − E, by fixing n = 2 and m = 3, such bound turns out to be
BP =
max
i=1,2,3
‖zi‖
δ0
with
δ0 = min
‖p‖=1
max
i=1,2,3
p′zi
‖zi‖ .
It can be shown that BP is in general much larger than the exact number of moves given by Theorem 1. For instance, for
106 randomly generated games, the ratio between BP and MD turned out ranging from about 1.2 to over 3000.
IV. LOWER BOUND ON CAPTURE TIME
Assume all players have complete information about the state of the game. The following theorem gives a lower bound
B on the capture time, i.e., the evader, playing a suitable strategy, may avoid capture for at least a time B, for any possible
pursuers’ strategy.
Theorem 2: Let
i∗ = arg max
i=1,2,3
1
2
(‖Vi(0)− Pi(0)‖+ ‖Vi(0)− E(0)‖)
and define V ∗(t) = Vi∗(t) and P
∗(t) = Pi∗(t), for all t.
Then, the evader is able to survive for at least a time B, where
B =
1
2
(‖V ∗(0)− P ∗(0)‖+ ‖V ∗(0)− E(0)‖) (9)
= max
i=1,2,3
1
2
(‖Vi(0)− Pi(0)‖+ ‖Vi(0)− E(0)‖) (10)
= max
i=1,2,3
(‖Vi(0)− E(0)‖
+
1
2
(‖Vi(0)− Pi(0)‖ − ‖Vi(0)− E(0)‖)) . (11)
Proof: Let us consider the following evader’s strategy. From its initial position E(0), it moves straight to Vi(0) for a
time τ1 = ‖E(0)− Vi(0)‖ for a given i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Since Vi(0) ∈ V(0), it can be arbitrarily approached, irrespectively of
the pursuers’ strategy.
Let d0 = ‖Pi(0)− Vi(0)‖. By (1), one has
d0 = ‖Pi(0)− Vi(0)‖ > ‖E(0)− Vi(0)‖ = τ1. (12)
Since the speed of the pursuers is set to 1, by (12) the distance between the evader and the pursuer Pi at time τ1 is such
that
‖Pi(τ1)− E(τ1)‖ = ‖Pi(τ1)− Vi(0)‖
≥ ‖Pi(0)− Vi(0)‖ − τ1 = d0 − τ1>0.
Define dτ1 = d0 − τ1 > 0. Let Z = (E(τ1) + Pi(τ1))/2 be the midpoint between E(τ1) and Pi(τ1). By the definition of
Voronoi cell, Z lies on the boundary of V(τ1). Assuming the evader goes straight to Z , it covers a distance
‖Z − E(τ1)‖ = ‖Pi(τ1)− E(τ1)‖
2
≥ dτ1
2
and then it is captured in Z . Hence, the time needed to cover the entire path turns out to be
T ≥ τ1 + dτ1
2
= τ1 +
d0 − τ1
2
=
1
2
(τ1 + d0)
=
1
2
(‖Vi(0)− E(0)‖+ ‖Vi(0)− Pi(0)‖) . (13)
Therefore, the right hand side of (13) is a lower bound to the evader’s survival time. By taking the maximum with respect to
i = 1, 2, 3, one gets the lower bound B in (10). The expressions (11) and (12) follow from straightforward manipulations.
V. COOPERATIVE VS DECENTRALIZED PURSUIT STRATEGIES
The aim of this section is to analyze the potential advantage of the pursuers to cooperate in the pursuit task, with respect to
adopting the D-strategy discussed in Section III. The following lemmas are instrumental to prove the main results. Hereafter,
the time dependence is omitted when it is clear from the context.
Lemma 1: Let the pursuers play the D-strategy and let l denote the longest edge of V . Then
MD ≤ l . (14)
Proof: Let S and Q be defined as in (5)-(6) and assume l = ‖V1 − V2‖, see Fig. 3. It holds
‖V1 − V3‖/‖V1 − V2‖ = ‖Q− V3‖/‖Q− S‖
= (‖V1 − V3‖ − ‖Q− V3‖)/(‖V1 − V2‖ − ‖Q− S‖).
Since ‖V1 − V3‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖ one has
‖V1 − V3‖ − ‖Q− V3‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖ − ‖Q− S‖
or equivalently
‖Q− V1‖ ≤ ‖V1 − V2‖ − ‖Q− S‖ .
So, by Theorem 1,
MD = ‖Q− S‖+ ‖Q− V1‖
≤ ‖Q− S‖+ ‖V1 − V2‖ − ‖Q− S‖ = l .
E
V2
V3
V1
S Q
Fig. 3. Game length when pursuer is playing the D-strategy. MD is the length of the bold line.
Lemma 2: Let B be given as in Theorem 2 and let l denote the largest edge of V . Then,
B ≥ l/2 . (15)
Proof: Let l = ‖V1 − V2‖. By the triangle inequality,
2max{‖E − V1‖, ‖E − V2‖} ≥ ‖E − V1‖+ ‖E − V2‖
≥ ‖V1 − V2‖ = l .
By (1) and (11), one has
B ≥ max
i=1,...,3
‖Vi − E‖ ≥ max{‖E − V1‖, ‖E − V2‖} ≥ l/2 .
For a given pursuit-evasion game, let us denote by C the optimal cooperative pursuers’ strategy and by MC the related
maximum capture time, i.e., the time at which capture occurs if the evader plays at its best. The following theorem reports
the relation between MC and the decentralized game length MD provided by Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Let MD be given by (8) and MC be the optimal game length in a cooperative pursuers’ setting. Then,
MC ≤MD ≤ 2MC . (16)
Proof: Since the C-strategy is optimal among all pursuit strategies, it cannot be worse than the D-strategy, and hence
MC ≤MD trivially holds. By (14) and (15), one has
MD ≤ l ≤ 2B ≤ 2MC
where the last inequality comes from the fact that B is a lower bound on the game length for any pursuers’ strategy.
By Theorem 3, one immediately has
B ≤MC ≤MD ≤ 2B ≤ 2MC . (17)
In the sequel, we prove that there exist games in which
MC = MD (18)
and other in which
MC =
1
2
MD (19)
this meaning that both bounds in (16) are tight.
Theorem 4: There exist games such that MC = MD.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we show that there exist games for which MD = B. In fact, by (17), MD = B implies
MC =MD . Let us choose a game initial condition such that V is a right triangle and let us adopt the notation shown in Fig. 4.
Since SQ is the hypotenuses of the triangle with vertices S, Q and V3, by Theorem 1, one easily getsMD ≥ ‖V1−V3‖ = m.
Moreover, by (14), it holds
m ≤MD ≤ l .
Let the smallest edge s shrink to 0. One has
lim
s→0
l = lim
s→0
√
m2 + s2 = m
and hence
lim
s→0
MD = m . (20)
Moreover, it is easy to show that as s→ 0, P1, E and V1 tend to be collinear. This implies that
lim
s→0
(‖V1 − P1‖ − ‖V1 − E‖) = lim
s→0
‖P1 − E‖ .
EV3
V2
V1
P1
S
Q
Fig. 4. As ‖V2 − V3‖ → 0, one has MD → B and hence MD =MC . The length of the bold line is equal to MD .
E(0)
V3(0)
V2(0) V1(0)H
P1(0) P2(0)
T1 T2
P3(0)
V(0)
S Q
K
Fig. 5. Voronoi cell V at time 0. As ‖V3 −H‖ → 0, one has MD → 2MC . The length of the bold line is equal to MD .
E(0)
V3(0)
V2(0) V1(τ) = V1(0)
P1(0) P2(0)
P3(0)
P1(τ)
P2(τ)
P3(τ)
E(τ)
V(0) V(τ )
V2(τ)
V3(τ)
H
Fig. 6. First step of strategy Ĉ. Voronoi cell V at time 0 (black) and at time τ (red).
By (11), one has
lim
s→0
B ≥ lim
s→0
(
‖V1 − E‖+ 1
2
(‖V1 − P1‖ − ‖V1 − E‖)
)
= lim
s→0
(
‖V1 − E‖+ 1
2
‖P1 − E‖
)
= m . (21)
Since MD ≥ B, by (20) and (21) one has
lim
s→0
MD = lim
s→0
B = m
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 5: There exists games such that MD = 2MC.
Proof: We show that there exist games in which MC = B and MD = 2B. Let V(0) be the isosceles triangle depicted
in Fig. 5. Define H,T1, T2 the projections of V3(0), P1(0), P2(0) on V1(0)V2(0), respectively. Let the evader initially lie on
the segment V3(0)H , define ε = ‖V3(0)−H‖ and K = E(0)+2(V3(0)−E(0)). Since ‖V3(0)−P1(0)‖ = ‖V3(0)−E‖ =
‖V3(0)−K‖ one has
‖P1(0)− T1‖ ≤ ‖P1(0)− V3(0)‖+ ‖V3(0)−H‖
= ‖V3(0)−K‖+ ‖V3(0)−H‖
≤ 2‖V3(0)−H‖ = 2ε . (22)
Now, let ε tend to 0. In Fig. 5, MD corresponds to the length of the bold line. By following a similar reasoning as in the
proof of Theorem 4, one has
lim
ε→0
MD = lim
ε→0
‖S −Q‖+ ‖Q− V1(0)‖ = ‖V2(0)− V1(0)‖ . (23)
Let us now introduce a two-step cooperative pursuers’ strategy, denoted by Ĉ. Let vQE = Q − E(0). Assume first that
the evader keeps moving in the half-plane v′QEe(t) ≥ 0 for a time of at least 2ε, i.e., the evader moves to the right in Fig. 5
(the case the evader moves in the half-plane v′QEe(t) ≤ 0 is similar). Since ε→ 0, such assumption is not restrictive. The
strategy Ĉ works as follows.
1) Initially, P1 moves towards T1, while P2 and P3 move symmetrically to the evader w.r.t. V1(0)V3(0) and V1(0)V2(0),
respectively, see Fig. 6.
2) As soon as (P1 − E) is parallel to (V1 − V2), the pursuers play the decentralized strategy D until capture occurs.
Notice that in the first step, P2 and P3 move in such a way to guarantee that V1, v12 and v13 remain the same, where v12
and v13 are defined as in (7).
Let τ be the time at which Ĉ-strategy switches to step 2 and by η the remaining time to conclude the game. Since by
(22) ‖P1(0)− T1‖ ≤ 2ε, one has τ ≤ 2ε. So, MĈ = τ + η ≤ 2ε+ η.
Notice that at time τ the Voronoi cell becomes a right triangle like the one reported in the proof of Theorem 4, see Fig. 6.
So, by Theorem 4, one has limε→0 η = ‖V1(τ) − V2(τ)‖. Then, as ε tends to 0, it holds
lim
ε→0
MĈ = limε→0 τ + ‖V1(τ)− V2(τ)‖
≤ lim
ε→0
2ε+ ‖V1(τ) − V2(τ)‖
= lim
ε→0
‖V1(τ) − V2(τ)‖
≤ ‖V1(0)−H‖
where the last inequality comes from the fact that V1(τ) = V1(0). Thus, by (23) and by the fact that the optimal cooperative
strategy is such that MC ≤MĈ , one has
lim
ε→0
MC ≤ lim
ε→0
MĈ ≤ ‖V1(0)−H‖ =
1
2
‖V2(0)− V1(0)‖
=
1
2
lim
ε→0
MD .
Since by (16), MC ≥MD/2, one gets
lim
ε→0
MC =
1
2
lim
ε→0
MD
which concludes the proof.
Remark 3: Notice that the two-step pursuers’ strategy Ĉ adopted in the proof of Theorem 5 is cooperative because in the
first step P1 moves orthogonally to the largest edge of V(0). Since the vertices V(0) are defined by the position of all the
pursuers (and the evader), it is apparent that such strategy requires complete knowledge of the game state.
TABLE I
RATIO δ FOR THE DIFFERENT GAMES IN FIG.7
V δ
equilateral triangle a) 0.866
equilateral triangle b) 0.902
isosceles triangle c) 0.968
isosceles triangle d) 0.690
VI. EXAMPLES
Let us define δ = MC
MD
. By Theorem 3, one has that in general 0.5 ≤ δ ≤ 1 .
By Theorem 5, one has that there exist games such that δ = 0.5, which means that playing a cooperative strategy for the
pursuers halves the game duration w.r.t. the decentralized strategy.
In this section, some examples are reported to show how the range of δ changes for some representative games. Clearly,
the smaller is δ, the larger improvement can be obtained by playing a cooperative strategy.
For a given game, MD and B can be easily computed by (8) and (10), respectively. So, by (17), one has
B
MD
≤ δ ≤ 1 . (24)
Define δ = B/MD . Clearly, δ provides a lower bound to δ, i.e., the maximum game length reduction which can be obtained
by playing the strategy C w.r.t. D.
In Fig. 7, the initial Voronoi cell V(0) and the evader position for different games are reported. For the sake of simplicity,
the positions of the pursuers are not reported since they can be easily derived from V(0) and E(0). As an example, if V(0)
is an equilateral triangle of side l and E lies in its geometrical center (see Fig. 7-a), one has
B =
√
3
2
l , MD = l , δ =
√
3
2
.
Moreover, notice that by (8), when V(0) is an equilateral triangle of side l one has MD = l for any position of the evader
inside V .
In Table I, the value of δ for each case depicted in Fig.7 is reported. For instance, when the initial game configuration is
the isosceles triangle c), the maximum benefit of playing in a cooperative way with respect to the D-strategy is less than
4%.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The advantage of cooperation in pursuit-evasion games has been investigated, for a game in the plane with three pursuers
and one evader. The maximum reduction of the capture time that can be achieved by using full information on the pursuers’
state has been derived. Such reduction has been also specified in terms of the game initial conditions. This contribution can
be seen as a first step towards a deeper understanding of the benefits provided by cooperation of the pursuers. Devising a
cooperative pursuit strategy achieving, or at least approaching, the lower bound on the game length, is an open problem.
The extension of the results presented in the paper to settings with more than three pursuers or with multiple evaders will
be the subject of future research. Another challenging objective is to address multi-pursuer games in bounded environments
(e.g., polygons), by building on recent results concerning the single-pursuer case [21], [22].
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In the first step of the E-strategy, the evader goes from E(0) to Q. So, step 1 takes a time τ1 = ‖E(0)−Q‖. In step 1,
according to (4a), P1 and P3 move in the same direction of the evader along e(0) = vQE , while P2 obeys to (4b) going
towards Q. As a result, only the smallest edge of V moves (along e(0)), while the others remain the same. The Voronoi cell
at time τ1 is depicted in red in Fig. 2.
Since V1(τ1) = V1(0) ∈ V(τ1), in the second step of the E-strategy the evader moving along vV1Q may safely approach
V1(0) at time τ12 = τ1 + τ2, with τ2 = ‖Q − V1(0)‖. So, V1(τ12) = V1(0). Notice that, as in the previous step, only the
smallest edge of V is moving in the second step. In Fig. 2, V(τ2) is colored in blue.
During the final step, the evader points towards the farthest vertex of V(τ2) moving along vSE . Since the Voronoi cell
at any time is a triangle similar to V(0), the farthest vertex from V1(τ2) = V1(0) turns out to be V2(τ2). By defining
τ3 = ‖V1(0) − V2(τ2)‖, it is easy to see that τ3 = ‖S − E(0)‖ and then the total traveled time is τ1 + τ2 + τ3, which
coincides with (8). At such a time, the Voronoi cell collapses to one point and capture occurs.
It remains to prove that the E-strategy is optimal when the pursuers play the D-strategy, i.e., there exists no other evader’s
strategy guaranteeing a longer survival.
At a given time τ , according to (8), let MD(τ) denote the residual game length if the pursuers and the evader play the
D-strategy and the E-strategy, respectively, from time τ onwards. Let the evader move along a direction ê : ‖ê‖ = 1 for a
time ∆τ > 0, i.e., E˙(t) = ê, τ ≤ t ≤ τ +∆τ . Let MD(τ +∆τ) be the corresponding residual game length at time τ +∆τ .
Let us define
∆M(∆τ) = MD(τ +∆τ)−MD(τ) (25)
As it has been shown above, if ê ∈ {vQE , vV1Q, vSE}, one has ∆M(∆τ) = −∆τ . Hence, along the three directions the
evader follows in the E-strategy, it holds
dMD(t)
dt
= lim
∆τ→0
∆M(∆τ)
∆τ
= −1 .
In the following, we prove that for any direction ê /∈ {vQE , vV1Q, vSE} one has dMD(t)dt < −1. So, the evader will be
captured in a shorter time and hence any evader’s strategy involving a move ê /∈ {vQE , vV1Q, vSE} cannot be optimal.
Let ê = [cos(θ), sin(θ)]′ with θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. Assume the evader moves along direction ê for a time ∆τ . We want to compute
dMD(t)
dt
as a function of θ. Let vij be defined as in (7). Let us consider the six directions ±v12, ±v13, ±v23, and the resulting
six angular intervals in which they partition the interval [0, 2pi], as shown in Fig. 8. Let l = ‖V1−V2‖, m = ‖V1−V3‖ and
denote by ϕ1 and ϕ2 the angles associated to vertices V1 and V2, respectively.
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Fig. 8. The six directions given by ±v12, ±vV13, ±v23 and the related angular intervals.
Let us start by assuming θ ∈ [0, ϕ2) and derive the expression of ∆M(∆τ). Let us refer to Fig. 9, where V(τ) and
V(τ +∆τ) are depicted in black and red, respectively. By (8), MD(τ) = ‖S(τ)−Q(τ)‖ + ‖Q(τ)− V1(τ)‖. It is easy to
see that ‖Q(τ + ∆τ) − V1(τ + ∆τ)‖ = ‖Q(τ) − V1(τ)‖. Let Q̂ = Q(τ) + ∆τ ê and define b = ‖Q(τ + ∆τ) − Q̂‖, see
Fig. 9. One has
‖S(τ +∆τ) −Q(τ +∆τ)‖ = ‖S(τ)−Q(τ)‖ − b
and hence
∆MD(∆τ)=‖S(τ +∆τ) −Q(τ +∆τ)‖ − ‖S(τ)−Q(τ)‖=−b.
By the law of sines, one has
b
sin(pi − θ − ϕ1) =
∆τ
sin(ϕ1)
that is
b = ∆τ
sin(pi − θ − ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
= ∆τ
sin(θ + ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
.
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Fig. 9. The evader moves along a direction belonging to the first interval. V(τ) and V(τ +∆τ) are depicted in black and red, respectively. The length
of the blue segment is equal to MD(τ) −MD(τ +∆τ).
Thus, one has
∆MD(∆τ) = −∆τ sin(θ + ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
and hence
dMD(t)
dt
= lim
∆τ→0
∆M(∆τ)
∆τ
= − sin(θ + ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
.
By using a similar reasoning, one can compute dMD(t)/dt for all the other cases. Table II reports the expressions of
dMD(t)/dt for θ belonging to the six angular intervals.
By straightforward calculus arguments, it is possible to show that such a function has three maxima in [0, 2pi), all equal
to −1. As expected, they are achieved when θ is equal to 0, pi and 2pi− ϕ1, which correspond to the directions vQE , vSE ,
vV1Q adopted in the E-strategy. Therefore, any other direction leads to a greater reduction of MD and thus it cannot be
optimal.

TABLE II
EXPRESSIONS OF dMD(t)/dt AS A FUNCTION OF θ
Case θ interval
dMD(t)
dt
1 [0, ϕ2) −
sin(θ+ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
2 [ϕ2, pi − ϕ1) −
sin(θ+ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
−
sin(θ−ϕ2)
sin(ϕ2)
3 [pi − ϕ1, pi) −
sin(θ−ϕ2)
sin(ϕ2)
4 [pi, pi + ϕ2) −
sin(θ−ϕ2)
sin(ϕ2)
+
sin(θ)
sin(ϕ1)
5 [pi + ϕ2, 2pi − ϕ1)
sin(θ)
sin(ϕ1)
6 [2pi − ϕ1, 2pi)
sin(θ)
sin(ϕ1)
−
sin(θ+ϕ1)
sin(ϕ1)
